Chhawa Ridge Battle-1948
in Jammu & Kasmir
Vancouver. BC, July 20, 2008
Soon after I took over 16 Field Regiment Artillery Signal Section
(16 Fd Regt Arty Sig Sec) at Deolali in October 1947, from Lieut
later Brigadier Ajit Singh at Deolali, it moved lock, stock and
barrel to Jammu for Operations. Due to non-existence of Rail and
roads betweens Pathankot and Jammu, it moved over hundreds of
seasonal streams overflowing with winter rains, thereby retarding
its speed to negligible. Despite best efforts, the Regiment made
Jammu in 14 days. Its guns, vehicles and equipment was so deplorable
and men fully exhausted that it took full 14 days rest at Jammu
for it to become battle-worthy. Eventually, it moved to its destination
at Naushahra. Being the only Arty Regt available in Jammu Division,
it covered all Operations conducted by Indian Troops.
During May, 1948 late Major (later Lieut Colonel retired) R.
N. Sawhney, Officer Commanding 19 (Indep) Inf Bde Sig Coy also
located at Naushahra, came to see me because his 10 days casual
leave to attend his sister’s marriage was turned down on
the ground that there was no other Sig Offr available in his Company
to officiate. He requested me to look after his Sig Coy for 10
days. He being a brother Sig Offr, I readily agreed. To obtain
formal concurrence, I met C.O of the Arty Regt who unhesitatingly
gave his nod. I accompanied Major Sawhney to the Bde Maj of the
Bde who asked me “Will you take full responsibility for
providing 100 per cent Sig Comns for the Bde, during Maj Sawhney’s
leave,? As I replied in affirmative, Maj Sawhney was sent on leave.
As luck would have it, 2 days after Maj Sawhey left, the Bde
Maj called me to his office. Pointing to a large wall map, he
said “Chhawa Ridge is a part of very high mountains. It
is occupied by a battalion of the Opposing Forces. It is reported
to be heavily fortified. The Bde Comdr has decided to capture
it” He briefed me fully on the Bde attack Plan. He emphasized
to me to provide excellent sig comns for the Operation as agreed
to by you earlier. I responded “ I shall do my very best”.
Calmly and seriously thinking over the sig comn requirements
of both the Bde and Arty Regt, I prepared a Sig Plan and called
Senior N C Os of my Sig Sec for briefing. As I finished briefing,
a number of the N C Os, hesitatingly said that “the Sig
Comns provided for Operations by the Sig coy in the past had never
worked to the satisfaction of Bde Comdr and Bde Maj” I was
flabbergasted and taken aback to hear it at the late stage of
my planning as I had least I expected it. Seriously considering
my N C Os observations , I cancelled my Signal Plan and carried
out the appreciation of the situation afresh.
After thorough consideration, I decided to combine resources
of both the Sig Coy and my Sig Sec and then detail operators according
to their suitability and importance of each task. The “Bde/Bns
B1 Net” being the most important for the success of Operation,
I detailed my Sig Sec’s best Naik Operator on its Control
Station and three best L/Nks on the 3 Battalions Stations. They
were augmented with equally good Operators from the Sig Coy.
Before the start of the Operations, I made sure that the sig
comns of both the Bde and Arty Regt were working perfectly. As
per the Bde plan, 4 Dogras under Col Davies were to launch a frontal
attack on Chhawa Ridge, while 4 Kumaon under Colonel Dhillon were
to provide them Covering Fire from the left. Our 25 pounder guns
pounded Chhawa Ridge continuously up to the given time
The Bde HQ consisting of the Bde Comdr, Bde Maj, myself and the
Control Wireless Station with 2 Operators were located on a hill-top,
from where the movements of 4 Dogras advancing through dense shrubs
were clearly visible. A little later, the Bde Comdr wanted to
speak to the C O 4 Dogras on R/T. My Naik Operator got C O Dogras
on the set and asked the Bde Comdr to speak. Their conversation
lasted a few minutes. As the Bde Comdr finished speaking, sitting
next to him, I said “ Sir, during the R/T conversation,
you asked for repetitions a few times. This was because of the
move of 4 Dogras, their set has gone out of net slightly. I shall
get it re-netted to avoid repetitions in future.“ Hearing
this, the Bde Comdr hurriedly “said No, No and No. Please
do not touch the net. I am very happy with the sig comns.”
In my mind, I thought maybe the observations of my seniors N C
Os were correct.
The Dogras launched frontal attack on Chhawa Ridge. After very
fierce fighting, including hand to hand, they captured their objective,
inflicting very heavy casualties on the opposing forces. They
also captured hundreds of prisoners of war (POW). They too, suffered
casualties because the terrain they mounted the attack from was
favorable to the enemy. Their wounded were evacuated to the nearest
hospital for treatment.
On the successful completion of the Operations, the Bde Comdr
appeared very pleased. He highly commended C O 4 Dogras for the
success in capturing the objective. He also specially commended
me for providing very good sig comns during the Operations.
I gathered men of both the Sig Coy and Sig Sec and told them
that the Bde Comdr was very pleased with the sig comns provided
during the Operation. You all very much deserve a pat on your
backs. I asked them to keep up the good name and always provide
good sig comns in future.
On his return from leave, Maj Sawhney learnt about the success
of sig comns during Chhawa Operation conducted in his absence.
He came to me to thank me for all I did for his Sig Coy in his
absence. I, explained to him the manner in which the Sig Comns
of both the Bde and Arty Regt were planned and conducted. He was
delighted to know about my new experiment of combining manpower
of his Coy and my Sig Sec for the operations
A few months later, the following casualty appeared in Western
Command Order No 386 dated July 30,1948:-
“Lieut Pritam Singh Jauhal brought to the notice of GOC-in-C
Western Command for gallantry and devotion to duty in action in
the Operations in Jammu and Kashmir“.
