By Imtiaz Ahmad
If the anti-dowry legislation was serious about curbing dowry, it should
have ensured that women received a share in the family property.
TWO SETS of questions have been raised by a few recent instances of
girls, who either refused to go through marriage or called it off because
their in-laws demanded dowry beyond their parents' paying capacity.
One, why does the practice, four decades after the stringent anti-dowry
law was enacted and a widespread social campaign launched, continue
unabated? Why has the law not been able to curb the practice when there
is general agreement that it should be stamped out? Second, is the law
susceptible to gross misuse in marital discord and what might be done
to clog this possibility?
To the first question the answer is simple. It is that there is a great
deal of social hypocrisy as a result of which we publicly condemn it
but at the same time accept and demand dowry.
The principal reason for this anomaly is that, while the burden of
public opinion expects us to eschew giving or taking dowry, the social
arrangements in which we operate continue the practice. There are many
dimensions to this: the patriarchal character of society which devalues
women so that their acceptance in marriage ought to be compensated materially,
the consumerist ethos that is a compelling force to get rich at one
stroke rather than slog for life and the ostentatious display of wealth
in an effort to demonstrate social standing.
One reason behind such considerations is that dowry functions as a
form of moveable assets in a society where land has been the chief property
resource.
Parents, according to customs which operate even after the enactment
of modern legislation, do not give their daughters a share in landed
property. Instead, they prefer to given them tangible assets in the
form of dowry. This becomes a source of bickering and bargain wherein
each party ends up trying to negotiate the best bargain. The terms are
negotiated on the estimate the groom's family has of the worth of the
bride's family.
Where the negotiations are fine-tuned, the marriage goes through smoothly
and dowry is happily exchanged. It is only where there is a wide gap
between what the groom's family estimates the bride's family can pay
and what the latter feels it can conveniently part with that trouble
arises.
Marriage negotiations simply break down in such cases. However, if
the demand is hiked at the time of the marriage ceremony or just before
the girl is sent off, as happened in the recently reported cases, the
dispute comes into public view and has to be settled one way or the
other through mediation by relatives and friends.
Where such mediation is not used the matter becomes one of law and
order. Families usually avoid such situations either to escape being
drawn into public controversy or to avoid marring their daughter's future
marital prospects, both of which reasons are easily understandable.
It is in this respect that the recent cases are commendable in that
in all these cases the girl rather than her family took the initiative
to bring the issue to public attention.
If the much-flogged Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, was intended to curb
the practice of dowry it should have not stopped at merely making the
giving and taking of dowry a cognisable and non-bailable offence and
providing for stringent punishment. It should have gone beyond tokenism
and assailed the very social arrangements which constitute the backbone
of this practice.
Considerable historical and sociological evidence exists to show that
the practice of dowry crept into Indian society out of the necessity
to keep women out of property so that family wealth would remain within
the patrilineal group. This is a universal stratagem societies have
adopted to maintain the continuity and stability of the patrilineal
group.
Where the law allows women a share in the family property, other stratagems
are adopted. For example, Muslim societies follow the principle of parallel-cousin
marriages to keep family property within the patrilineal group because
Muslim law allows women the right to inherit family assets including
land. South Asia is an exception in this respect because the enactment
of the Shariat Act, 1937, disallowed women a share in arable land.
If the anti-dowry legislation was serious about curbing the practice
of dowry, it should have ensured that women received a share in the
family property, which continues to be denied to them even after substantial
legal reforms were brought about. If women were guaranteed property
rights there would be no reason for substantial marriage transactions
as a woman's husband and his parents would know that at the appropriate
time she would secure her share of the family property. Since the social
arrangements in place at the moment deny women that right, a woman's
in-laws demand a share of the family property in the form of dowry and
many women themselves desire that they be given a good dowry.
Academic research on women's rights on land shows that one of the reasons
offered by women for not preferring a claim to the family property is
that they feel that if they did so they would be demanding two shares,
one at the time of their marriage and another after the death of their
parents.
Yet another stratagem the law could have contemplated was to bring
marriage transactions within the net of income and wealth tax as it
applies to gifts. Because none of these provisions was contemplated,
it is hardly surprising that the law has proved to be ineffective.
This brings us to the second question. Conflict is endemic to marital
life. Family sociology offers no clues as to the level of friction found
among married couples, nor about the means employed to deal with marital
discord.
Evidence exists, however, that a newly-wedded woman is usually subjected
to taunts and bickering. Such bickering may relate to dowry, division
of household chores or even the social and economic background of the
woman and her natal family. Such bickering usually stops a few years
after the marriage, particularly after the couple has a child.
Traditionally, women endured such bickering until they consolidated
their position. Nowadays, some women brought up on notions of personal
autonomy and nuclear living sometimes take resort to legal action to
teach a lesson to their erring in-laws, to get even for harassing them
or to negotiate a nuclear living arrangement in the bargain. When this
course is taken, provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act are often used.
A well-worked network is in place in cities and district towns to turn
and twist incidents, represent them as instances of dowry-related violence,
arrange a medical examination and file a petition.
Money easily passes hands at every stage and, ultimately, more than
the woman, it is those whose favour has to be invoked in order to get
the case instituted who seem to be the greatest beneficiaries.
Both legal loopholes need to be plugged.